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OPINION OF THE COURT

FISHER, Circuit Judge.
This appeal presents a question of the propriety of a
preliminary injunction enforcing, under Pennsylvania law, a
restrictive covenant not to compete. However, because the
parties concede on appeal that the lack of complete diversity
deprives this Court of subject matter jurisdiction, the threshold
question before us is how to proceed in light of this
jurisdictional defect. At the request of the plaintiff-appellee, we
will exercise our authority under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 21 to dismiss the dispensable nondiverse party, and
thereby restore this Court’s jurisdiction to reach the merits of the
appeal. Because the restrictive covenant is an appropriately
narrow protection of a legitimate business interest, and because
Zambelli remains the appropriate entity to enforce the covenant
under Pennsylvania state law, we will affirm the District Court’s
holding in those regards. However, because the District Court
failed to require a bond in connection with the injunction, as
3

required by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65(c), we will
vacate the injunction and remand with instructions to impose
such a bond should the District Court reissue the injunction.
I.
A.
Plaintiff Zambelli Fireworks Manufacturing Co., Inc.
d/b/a Zambelli Fireworks Internationale (“Zambelli”) is one of
the oldest and largest fireworks companies in the United States,
doing business in approximately 40 states. The company was
historically family-owned and operated, first by George
Zambelli, Sr. and later by his children Marcy, Danabeth, and
George Zambelli, Jr. Zambelli is a corporation incorporated
under the laws of Pennsylvania, with its principal place of
business in New Castle, Pennsylvania.
Defendant Pyrotecnico F/X, LLC (“Pyrotecnico”) has
been a direct competitor of Zambelli in the fireworks industry
for many years. Pyrotecnico is comprised of several related
companies, all of which are managed by Stephen Vitale.
Pyrotecnico is a limited liability company registered under the
laws of Nevada. Its sole member is Pyrotecnico of Louisiana,
LLC, another limited liability company registered under the laws
of Louisiana. Stephen Vitale, a resident of New Castle,
Pennsylvania, is the managing member of Pyrotecnico of
Louisiana, LLC.
Defendant Matthew Wood (“Wood”), a resident of
Pompano Beach, Florida, works in the fireworks industry as a
4

pyrotechnician and choreographer, executing fireworks displays
in combination with music through the use of computer
software. Prior to Wood’s employment with Zambelli, Wood
obtained an associate’s degree in technical theater from
Vincennes University and a bachelor’s degree in theater from
Indiana State University. Wood also had prior pyrotechnics
experience in the areas of sales, agreements, design work,
effects, and pyrodigital software. Although Wood had some
prior experience with stage pyrotechnics and home fireworks, he
had little experience in aerial fireworks displays on the scale of
Zambelli’s major shows.
In 2001, Zambelli hired Wood to work in its Florida
office pursuant to the terms of an employment agreement
containing a two-year non-compete provision. Wood’s initial
responsibilities with Zambelli included work on new and
existing accounts, calling on customers, applying for permits,
reviewing sites, and attending trade conferences.
His
responsibilities expanded over time as Zambelli provided Wood
with valuable pyrotechnics training. Specifically, Wood
received training in the layout and choreography of shows as
well as the setup and use of the Zambelli systems. Wood gained
hands-on experience and application of these skills by helping
shoot aerial fireworks displays for Zambelli customers. In 2007,
Zambelli paid for Wood to become a certified trainer for the
Pyrotechnic Guild International. Wood also became licensed in
Colorado and New York during the course of his employment
with Zambelli.
In fulfilling his job responsibilities, Wood was privy to
many of the inner workings of Zambelli’s business. He was
5

responsible for preparing business proposals, which required
access to pricing information, contract terms, and client lists. In
particular, Wood had access to an Excel spreadsheet that
contained the formula Zambelli used to price its shows. Wood
was also aware of the prices that Zambelli paid for its fireworks
shells.
A significant portion of Wood’s responsibilities required
contact with Zambelli clients. Both in preparing business
proposals and before and after fireworks shows, Wood was in
communication with Zambelli clients throughout the country.
Because Zambelli advertised Wood as one of its premier
choreographers in connection with some of its highest profile
shows, Wood’s skills and experience were known both in the
pyrotechnics industry and to Zambelli clients.
As Wood assumed increasing responsibilities in the
Zambelli company, the Zambelli family considered Wood to be
the “next generation” and “future of the company.” Thus in
2005, the Zambellis asked Wood to sign an updated employment
agreement that would ensure Wood’s continued commitment to
the company. This later agreement, signed June 2, 2005 (the
“2005 Agreement”), superseded the earlier 2001 employment
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agreement.1 The 2005 Agreement contained, inter alia, a
number of provisions, including:
1. A clause prohibiting Wood from “engag[ing]
in any manner in the pyrotechnic business” within
the Continental United States or taking any
position of employment with any company
engaged in the sale or production of pyrotechnic
displays for a period of two years after leaving
Zambelli;
2. A non-solicitation provision proscribing Wood
from soliciting any former customers or clients of
Zambelli as well as any Zambelli employees for
alternative employment for a period of two years
after leaving Zambelli;
3.
A confidentiality clause preventing the
disclosure or use of trade secrets or any

1

Wood argued in the District Court that there was not
sufficient consideration to bind him to the 2005 Agreement
because he was already employed by Zambelli. The District
Court held that Wood’s “significant raise . . . contemporaneous
with the signing of the 2005 Employment Agreement” was
sufficient consideration to render the agreement valid. Zambelli
Fireworks Mfg. Co., Inc. v. Wood, No. 2:08-cv-415, 2009 WL
159182, at *11 (W.D. Pa. Jan. 21, 2009). That issue was not
raised on appeal and we do not address it here.
7

information regarding the operation of Zambelli’s
business;
4. A provision that Wood provide Zambelli with
three months’ notice of resignation;
5. A provision permitting a court to modify the
terms of the 2005 Agreement in order to render it
enforceable in the event the non-compete
provision was found to be unreasonable;
6. A provision whereby Wood agreed to pay all
legal fees, costs, and expenses if Zambelli
prevailed in a legal proceeding to enforce the
terms of the 2005 Agreement;
7. A choice of law provision stating that
Pennsylvania law would govern the interpretation
of the 2005 Agreement.
In May 2007, a major sale of Zambelli’s stock took place,
after which the company was no longer wholly owned by
Zambelli family members. The transaction was structured as a
stock sale as opposed to an asset purchase for a variety of
reasons, including the retention of various state and federal
permits, licenses, and contractual relationships. Following the
sale, George Zambelli, Jr. was the only remaining Zambelli
family member with stock ownership in the company. His
interest increased from 20% to 50% and he acquired a right of
first refusal to purchase outstanding stock from other
shareholders. A holding company made up of four private
8

investors acquired the remaining 50% of the stock. One of those
investors, Douglas Taylor, assumed the role of CEO and
President of Zambelli.
Wood, who had initially been attracted to the family-run
nature of Zambelli, was displeased with the change in
management and uncertain of the security of his employment
with Zambelli. In January 2008, Taylor presented Wood with an
“Employment Proposal” that outlined terms for a new
employment agreement, requiring, among other things, that
Wood assume substantial new job responsibilities. Wood did
not sign the proposal.
In light of the changes in management and the
expectation of increased job responsibilities, Wood contacted
Stephen Vitale, Pyrotecnico’s manager, in October 2007
regarding potential employment with Pyrotecnico. Vitale and
Wood eventually executed an employment agreement in which
Pyrotecnico agreed to hire Wood. It was a condition of Wood’s
employment with Pyrotecnico that he not take or use any
Zambelli information or bring any trade secrets or proprietary
information from Zambelli. Pyrotecnico was aware of the
restrictive covenant in Wood’s 2005 Agreement with Zambelli
and agreed to pay Wood his salary for two years if the covenant
were enforced and to indemnify Wood for his litigation
expenses.
On February 11, 2008, Wood provided Zambelli with
eleven days’ notice that he was resigning, effective February 22,
2008. Wood began working for Pyrotecnico on March 3, 2008.
Since his employment with Pyrotecnico, Wood and Pyrotecnico
9

have actively attempted to minimize any conduct that may
constitute a breach of the 2005 Agreement with Zambelli.
Wood’s work with Pyrotecnico is only internal and he does not
have client or customer contacts.
Wood’s duties with
Pyrotecnico primarily consist of editing music, serving as a
technician or shooter on firework shows, assisting in the design
of shows for existing Pyrotecnico customers, and training other
employees in pyrotechnics.
B.
Zambelli filed this action on March 26, 2008, against
Wood and Pyrotecnico. Zambelli sought, inter alia, to enforce
the terms of the restrictive covenant not to compete contained in
the 2005 Agreement with Wood.2 Zambelli filed a motion for
a preliminary injunction, which the District Court granted in part
on January 21, 2009. Zambelli Fireworks Mfg. Co., Inc. v.

2

Although the enforcement action was asserted against
Wood, Zambelli filed a variety of other claims against Wood
and Pyrotecnico, individually and jointly. Zambelli alleged
misappropriation of trade secrets under 12 Pa. Cons. Stat. §
5301 et seq. against Wood, breach of fiduciary duty of loyalty
against Wood, intentional interference with existing contractual
relations against Wood and Pyrotecnico, intentional interference
with prospective economic advantage against Wood and
Pyrotecnico, unfair competition against Wood and Pyrotecnico,
and civil conspiracy against Wood and Pyrotecnico. The
preliminary injunction enforcing the non-compete clause is the
only subject of this appeal.
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Wood, No. 2:08-cv-415, 2009 WL 159182 (W.D. Pa. Jan. 21,
2009).
The District Court held that the 2005 Agreement between
Zambelli and Wood was enforceable under Pennsylvania state
law. Specifically, the District Court held that Zambelli’s
protectable business interests included “customer goodwill” and
“Wood’s specialized training, knowledge and skill . . . acquired
during his seven years of employment[.]” Id. at *10. The Court
also upheld the durational and geographic restrictions contained
in the non-compete provision, but limited the scope of the
restricted activities because the agreement, as written, “would
literally prevent [Wood] from engaging in his chosen profession,
[and] is not necessary for the protection of Zambelli’s legitimate
business interests[.]” Id. at *16. Accordingly, the Court “bluepenciled” the 2005 Agreement to conform to its preliminary
injunction, which provided:
Matthew Wood is hereby enjoined for a period of
two years following the cessation of his
employment with Zambelli on February 22, 2008
(i.e., until February 22, 2010) from designing or
choreographing aerial pyrotechnic displays;
Matthew Wood and Pyrotecnico F/X, LLC are
enjoined for the same two-year period from
contacting or soliciting business from any
customer(s) or client(s) of Zambelli within the
continental United States with whom Wood had
business contact as an employee, agent or
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representative of Zambelli during the period of his
employment with Zambelli; and
Matthew Wood and Pyrotecnico F/X, LLC are
enjoined for the same two-year period from
publicizing, promoting or referencing Wood’s
design or choreography talent, experience and/or
accomplishments while employed at Zambelli in
any advertising, marketing or sales endeavors.
Id. at *18. The District Court concluded that “the balance of the
equities favor[ed] enforcement of the 2005 Employment
Agreement as modified[.]” Id. This timely appeal followed.
On appeal, Wood and Pyrotecnico ask us to vacate the
injunction on a variety of grounds. First, they contend that the
2007 stock sale effected a change of the Zambelli corporate
entity that prevents “new” Zambelli from enforcing the 2005
Agreement absent an express assignment. Second, they argue
that the restrictive covenant does not protect a legitimate
business interest as required by Pennsylvania law. Third, they
suggest the District Court was biased in its consideration by its
allegedly improper observation that Wood had intentionally
breached the 2005 Agreement. Finally, they argue that the
District Court erred in failing to impose a bond as required by
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65. Pyrotecnico also argues
that it should not have been included in the scope of the
injunction because it was not a party to the 2005 Agreement.
Because we will dismiss Pyrotecnico as a nondiverse party and
will vacate the injunction, this last issue is moot. After

12

satisfying ourselves of our jurisdiction to proceed, we will
address the remaining arguments in turn.
II.
The District Court predicated its jurisdiction on the
diversity of the parties under 28 U.S.C. § 1332. Though the
absence of complete diversity deprives all federal courts of
subject matter jurisdiction over this action, a federal court
always has jurisdiction to determine its jurisdiction. United
States v. Ruiz, 536 U.S. 622, 628 (2002). We have appellate
jurisdiction to review an interlocutory appeal from the entry of
a preliminary injunction under 28 U.S.C § 1292(a)(1). We
“review an order granting a preliminary injunction for abuse of
discretion, the factual findings for clear error, and the
determinations of questions of law de novo.” Bennington Foods
LLC v. St. Croix Renaissance Group, LLP, 528 F.3d 176, 178
(3d Cir. 2008).
III.
A.
The threshold question before this Court is our subject
matter jurisdiction in light of the absence of complete diversity
among the parties. Federal courts are courts of limited
jurisdiction, and when there is a question as to our authority to
hear a dispute, “it is incumbent upon the courts to resolve such
doubts, one way or the other, before proceeding to a disposition
on the merits.” Carlsberg Res. Corp. v. Cambria Sav. & Loan
Ass’n, 554 F.2d 1254, 1256 (3d Cir. 1977).
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1.
We begin with the question of whether we have subject
matter jurisdiction over this dispute. This case presents us with
the opportunity to address, for the first time in this circuit, the
rule for determining the citizenship of a limited liability
company (“LLC”) for diversity jurisdiction purposes. We now
join our sister circuits in holding that the citizenship of an LLC
is determined by the citizenship of each of its members.
The District Court below premised jurisdiction on the
diversity of the parties, based on Zambelli’s pleading in its
Verified Complaint that it was a corporate citizen of
Pennsylvania, Wood was a citizen of Florida, and Pyrotecnico
“is a Nevada limited liability company with its principal place
of business [in Nevada].” (App. 50.) Pyrotecnico admitted this
allegation in its Answer. The citizenship of the members of
Pyrotecnico was not pled. However, in the course of the trial
proceedings, Stephen Vitale, a Pennsylvania resident employed
in Pyrotecnico’s New Castle, Pennsylvania headquarters,
testified that Pyrotecnico was a wholly-owned subsidiary of
Pyrotecnico of Louisiana, LLC, of which he was the managing
member. (App. 920.)
Based on this record, this Court sua sponte noted the
apparent absence of complete diversity and directed the parties
to submit supplemental briefing on the question of this Court’s
jurisdiction. In supplemental briefing, all parties conceded the
absence of complete diversity based on the rule, articulated in
our sister circuits, that the citizenship of an LLC is determined
by the citizenship of its members. Because Vitale is a citizen of
14

Pennsylvania and a member of Pyrotecnico, he is not diverse
from Zambelli, also a citizen of Pennsylvania.
Although the parties concede the absence of complete
diversity on appeal, this circuit has not previously addressed the
question of how to determine the citizenship of an LLC for
diversity jurisdiction purposes. We will do so here in the hope
of preventing the needless expenditure of litigant and judicial
resources that occurs when a case proceeds to trial in the
absence of subject matter jurisdiction.
Our jurisdiction to hear cases in diversity arises under 28
U.S.C. § 1332(a), which provides that district courts “have
original jurisdiction of all civil actions where the matter in
controversy exceeds the sum or value of $75,000, exclusive of
interest and, and is between . . . citizens of different States.”
Complete diversity requires that, in cases with multiple plaintiffs
or multiple defendants, no plaintiff be a citizen of the same state
as any defendant. See Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Svcs.
Inc., 545 U.S. 546, 553 (2005); Kaufman v. Allstate N.J. Insur.
Co., 561 F.3d 144, 148 (3d Cir. 2009). The key inquiry in
establishing diversity is thus the “citizenship” of each party to
the action.
Most rules of citizenship are well established. A natural
person is deemed to be a citizen of the state where he is
domiciled. See Swiger v. Allegheny Energy, Inc., 540 F.3d 179,
182 (3d Cir. 2008) (citing Gilbert v. David, 235 U.S. 561, 569
(1915)). A corporation is a citizen both of the state where it is
incorporated and of the state where it has its principal place of
business. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c). And a partnership, as an
15

unincorporated entity, takes on the citizenship of each of its
partners. Swiger, 540 F.3d at 182.
We are asked now to resolve the citizenship of an LLC,
a relatively new unincorporated business entity possessing some
characteristics of both a corporation and a partnership.
Although limited liability entities resemble corporations in many
respects, including the passive management role performed by
both limited liability entity-owners and corporate shareholders,
see Carden v. Arkoma Assocs., 494 U.S. 185, 200 (1990)
(O’Connor, J., dissenting) (arguing that passive owners are not
real parties to the controversy and should be discounted for
purposes of Section 1332), the Supreme Court has flatly rejected
arguments in favor of extending the rule of corporate citizenship
to analogously formed business entities, see id. at 189
(“[A]lthough possessing ‘some of the characteristics of a
corporation’ . . . [an unincorporated entity] may not be deemed
a ‘citizen’ under the jurisdictional rule established for
corporations[;] . . . [t]hat rule must not be extended.”); see also
United Steelworkers of Am. v. R.H. Bouligny, Inc., 382 U.S. 145,
146-47 (1965) (declining to extend the corporation exception to
an unincorporated labor union); Great S. Fire Proof Hotel Co.
v. Jones, 177 U.S. 449, 454 (1900) (declining to extend the
corporation exception to a “limited partnership association”);
Chapman v. Barney, 129 U.S. 677, 682 (1889) (declining to
extend the corporation exception to an unincorporated “joint
stock company”).
For this reason, every federal court of appeals to address
the question has concluded that a limited liability company, as
an unincorporated business entity, should be treated as a
16

partnership for purposes of establishing citizenship. See Harvey
v. Grey Wolf Drilling Co., 542 F.3d 1077, 1080 (5th Cir. 2008);
Pramco, LLC ex rel. CFSC Consortium, LLC v. San Juan Bay
Marina, Inc., 435 F.3d 51, 54 (1st Cir. 2006); Wise v. Wachovia
Sec., LLC, 450 F.3d 265, 267 (7th Cir. 2006); Johnson v.
Columbia Props. Anchorage, LP, 437 F.3d 894, 899 (9th Cir.
2006); Gen. Tech. Applications, Inc. v. Exro Ltda, 388 F.3d 114,
120 (4th Cir. 2004); GMAC Commercial Credit LLC v. Dillard
Dep’t Stores, Inc., 357 F.3d 827, 829 (8th Cir. 2004); Rolling
Greens MHP, L.P. v. Comcast SCH Holdings L.L.C., 374 F.3d
1020, 1022 (11th Cir. 2004); Handelsman v. Bedford Village
Assocs. Ltd. P'ship, 213 F.3d 48, 51 (2d Cir. 2000). We now
join them in that holding.
As we have held before, the citizenship of partnerships
and other unincorporated associations is determined by the
citizenship of its partners or members. Swiger, 540 F.3d at 182.
Accordingly, the citizenship of an LLC is determined by the
citizenship of its members. And as with partnerships, where an
LLC has, as one of its members, another LLC, “the citizenship
of unincorporated associations must be traced through however
many layers of partners or members there may be” to determine
the citizenship of the LLC. Hart v. Terminex Int’l, 336 F.3d
541, 543 (7th Cir. 2003) (quotation omitted).
In light of this rule, Pyrotecnico’s presence defeats
complete diversity in this case. On the plaintiff side, Zambelli,
as a corporation incorporated under the laws of Pennsylvania
and with its principal place of business in New Castle,
Pennsylvania, is a citizen of Pennsylvania. On the defendant
side, Wood, who is domiciled in Florida, is a citizen of Florida.
17

And Pyrotecnico, despite being a Nevada limited liability
company, has a single member: Pyrotecnico of Louisiana, LLC,
a Louisiana limited liability company. Tracing its citizenship
through the layers, Pyrotecnico takes on the citizenship of the
members of Pyrotecnico of Louisiana, including its managing
member Stephen Vitale. Because Stephen Vitale is a resident of
New Castle, Pennsylvania, Pyrotecnico is a citizen of
Pennsylvania and is not diverse from Zambelli, another citizen
of Pennsylvania. Complete diversity is therefore lacking.
2.
Having established that we lack subject matter
jurisdiction, all parties agree that the suit cannot proceed with
Pyrotecnico as a party. Zambelli argues that Pyrotecnico is a
dispensable party under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 19(b)
and that this Court should exercise its authority under Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 21 to dismiss Pyrotecnico and proceed
to hear the appeal on the merits as between Zambelli and Wood.
Wood argues that Pyrotecnico is indispensable and that the
dismissal of Pyrotecnico necessitates the dismissal of Wood.
Under this Court’s continuing obligation to assess its
subject matter jurisdiction, we can dismiss a suit sua sponte for
lack of subject matter jurisdiction at any stage in the proceeding.
Carlsberg Res. Corp., 554 F.2d at 1256.
However,
considerations of efficiency, fairness, and judicial economy
weigh against a wholesale dismissal of the action at this stage.
See Caterpillar Inc. v. Lewis, 519 U.S. 61, 75 (1996) (“Once a
diversity case has been tried in federal court, with rules of
decision supplied by state law[,] . . . considerations of finality,
18

efficiency, and economy become overw helming.”);
Newman-Green, Inc. v. Alfonzo-Larrain, 490 U.S. 826, 836
(1989) (“[R]equiring dismissal after years of litigation would
impose unnecessary and wasteful burdens on the parties, judges,
and other litigants waiting for judicial attention.”). Such
considerations are particularly relevant where, as here, the
contract at the heart of this litigation is between two diverse
parties who could refile an identical suit in the same federal
forum.
Alternatively, we may exercise our authority under Rule
21 to dismiss the nondiverse party and proceed with the appeal.
Rule 21 provides that “[o]n motion or on its own, the court may
at any time, on just terms, add or drop a party.” Although the
rule technically directs the authority of district courts, the
Supreme Court confirmed its applicability to federal courts of
appeals in Newman-Green. In Newman-Green the district court
proceeded to summary judgment with the jurisdictional flaw –
the absence of complete diversity – undetected. 490 U.S. at
828-29. The court of appeals noticed the flaw, invited the
parties to address it, and, en banc, returned the case to the
district court “to determine whether it would be prudent to drop
[the jurisdiction spoiler] from the litigation.” Id. at 830. On
certiorari, the Supreme Court held that the Court of Appeals
itself had authority “to dismiss a dispensable nondiverse party”
under Rule 21. Id. at 837.
Our ability to dismiss a party thus turns on whether that
party is dispensable to the litigation, a question over which the
parties disagree. Whether a party is dispensable is determined
by Rule 19(b), which states:
19

If a person who is required to be joined if feasible
cannot be joined, the court must determine
whether, in equity and good conscience, the
action should proceed among the existing parties
or should be dismissed. The factors for the court
to consider include: (1) the extent to which a
judgment rendered in the person's absence might
prejudice that person or the existing parties; (2)
the extent to which any prejudice could be
lessened or avoided by: (A) protective provisions
in the judgment; (B) shaping the relief; or (C)
other measures; (3) whether a judgment rendered
in the person's absence would be adequate; and
(4) whether the plaintiff would have an adequate
remedy if the action were dismissed for
nonjoinder.
Fed. R. Civ. Pr. 19(b). Applying Rule 19(b), we have held that
parties are indispensable if “in the circumstances of the case
[they] must be before the court.” Steel Valley Auth. v. Union
Switch & Signal Div., 809 F.2d 1006, 1011 (3d Cir. 1987)
(internal quotations omitted). In other words, indispensable
parties are “‘[p]ersons who not only have an interest in the
controversy, but an interest of such a nature that a final decree
cannot be made without either affecting that interest, or leaving
the controversy in such a condition that its final termination may
be wholly inconsistent with equity and good conscience.’” Id.
(quoting Shields v. Barrow, 58 U.S. 130, 139 (1854)).
Zambelli argues that Pyrotecnico is dispensable because
“[a]t its heart, the case below centered around the former
20

employment relationship . . . between Zambelli and Wood.”
(Zambelli Supp. Br. 3.) Wood counters that Pyrotecnico is
indispensable because “[t]he claims against Pyrotecnico are
integral to the case[,]” (Wood Supp. Br. 2), including civil
conspiracy claims against Pyrotecnico alleging Wood was a coconspirator.
Weighing the Rule 19(b) factors, Pyrotecnico is not an
indispensable party in this case. The claims against Wood and
Pyrotecnico jointly, including the conspiracy claims, allege
theories of joint and several liability, which need not be tried
together under state law. See, e.g., Baker v. AC& S Inc., 729
A.2d 1140 (Pa. Super. 1999) (holding parties who are jointly
and severally liable need not be joined because the plaintiff can
recover fully from any one of multiple joint tort-feasors (citing
42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 8322)). The remaining claims against
Pyrotecnico individually can be pursued in state court. Full
relief is therefore available from both parties, albeit in separate
forums.
Further, Wood’s argument that “[t]he relief sought and
obtained in the District Court was likewise directed to both
Pyrotecnico and Wood” (Wood Supp. Br. 2), is particularly
unpersuasive in light of Wood’s allocation of three pages in his
opening brief to the argument that Pyrotecnico should not have
been included in the injunction because “the only cause of
action remaining, and the only one on which the District Court
could have based its partial grant of the preliminary injunction,
was Count I for breach of contract against Wood.” (Wood Br.
27.) Certainly for purposes of this appeal, which is limited only
to the propriety of the injunction enforcing the non-compete
21

agreement, Wood has essentially conceded that Pyrotecnico is
not only dispensable but was inappropriately included in the
scope of the injunction.
Accordingly, we hold that Pyrotecnico is a dispensable
party to this action and we will exercise our Rule 21 authority to
dismiss Pyrotecnico on appeal, thus restoring complete diversity
in this case. Having cured the jurisdictional defect, we now
proceed to the merits of the appeal.
B.
Wood first argues that the injunction is improper because
the District Court incorrectly concluded that Zambelli was able
to enforce the non-compete clause despite its failure to
specifically assign the 2005 Agreement when the 2007 stock
sale took place. In support of this position, Wood relies on Hess
v. Gebhard & Co., 808 A.2d 912 (Pa. 2002), which held that,
under Pennsylvania law, “a restrictive covenant not to compete,
contained in an employment agreement, is not assignable to the
purchasing business entity, in the absence of a specific
assignability provision, where the covenant is included in a sale
of assets.” Id. at 922.
Wood’s argument incorrectly assumes that a corporation
that undergoes a substantial change in stock ownership is a
separate “purchasing business entity” so that any restrictive
covenants it seeks to enforce must be assigned to it by its
predecessor. Hess was clearly premised on a “sale of assets”
and not a transfer of stock. Hess does not answer the question
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presented here as to what assignment, if any, is required when
a corporation merely transfers a majority of its stock.
Our research reveals no Pennsylvania appellate cases
addressing the impact of a stock sale on the enforceability of a
non-compete agreement. However, one district court in this
circuit, confronted with a similar question, persuasively
concluded under Pennsylvania law that a stock sale, unlike a
sale of assets, does not necessitate an assignment in order for the
corporation to enforce an employment agreement. See Siemens
Med. Sols. Health Servs. Corp. v. Carmelengo, 167 F. Supp. 2d
752, 758 (E.D. Pa. 2001). In Siemens, a purchaser acquired all
of the stock of Shared Medical Systems, Corp. (“SMS”). SMS,
under a new name, later sought to enforce the terms of an
employment agreement against an employee. The defendant
argued that the stock sale effected a corporate change in the
employer such that he was no longer bound by the employment
agreement. The Siemens Court rejected this argument, noting,
“It is a basic tenet of corporate law that a change in stock
ownership is merely a transfer of shareholder rights which does
not, in and of itself, normally affect the existence of the
corporate entity.” Id. (citing Black’s Law Dictionary 340 (6th
ed. 1990) and Victoria A. Braucher, 6A Fletcher Cyc. Corp., §
2843 (1997), for the proposition that stock ownership does not
merge the legal identity of the shareholders and the corporate
entity). The court concluded that the post-sale employer could
enforce the employment agreement “because there [had] been no
change in the corporate identity of his employer.” Id. at 759.
Consistent with this conclusion, Pennsylvania courts have
historically held that the transfer of a corporation’s stock does
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not destroy the corporate entity because “a corporation is an
entity irrespective of, and entirely distinct from, the persons who
own its stock.” Commonwealth v. Monongahela Bridge Co., 64
A. 909, 912 (Pa. 1906) (holding sale of all stock of bridge
company to the city of Pittsburgh did not dissolve the corporate
entity or dispatch the company’s contract rights); accord
Corporate Express Office Prods., Inc. v. Phillips, 847 So.2d
406, 414 (Fla. 2003) (“[B]ased on fundamental principles of
commercial transactions and the applicable statutes, we hold
that, in contrast to an asset purchase, neither a 100 percent
purchase of corporate stock nor a corporate merger affects the
enforceability of a noncompete agreement.”).
Based on our review of Pennsylvania law and these
axiomatic principles of corporate transactions, we agree that a
stock sale, unlike a sale of assets, does not alter the corporate
entity. Accordingly, we believe the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court would hold that the transfer of some or all of the stock of
a corporation has no effect on its ability to enforce a noncompete agreement. Because Zambelli’s 2007 corporate
restructuring was a stock sale rather than an asset purchase,
there was no need for an assignment of the non-compete
provision.
Finally, we briefly address Wood’s argument that Hess’s
holding turns on whether the intentions of the parties to the
original employment agreement survive any corporate
restructuring. We do not read Hess to require such a subjective
and unworkable analysis. The court in Hess noted that an
employment contract “is personal to the performance of both the
employer and employee, the touchstone of which is that trust
24

that each has in the other,” 808 A.2d at 922, only in support of
its conclusion that we should not gratuitously read an
assignment into an employment agreement when there has been
a change in the corporate entity. As we explained above, a stock
sale is not a change in the corporate entity. A change in
corporate culture alone cannot invalidate a legally binding
contract. If Wood’s employment agreement with Zambelli was
intended to be contingent upon Zambelli continuing as a familyowned and operated business, those terms should have been
included as material conditions to the 2005 Agreement.
We therefore hold that Zambelli, as the same corporate
entity that entered into the 2005 Agreement, may now seek to
enforce that agreement against Wood, and we affirm the District
Court’s holding to that effect.
C.
Next, we address the enforceability of the non-compete
agreement on its terms. Although restrictive covenants are a
disfavored restraint on trade under Pennsylvania law, they are
enforceable in equity where they are “incident to an employment
relationship between the parties; the restrictions imposed by the
covenant are reasonably necessary for the protection of the
employer; and the restrictions imposed are reasonably limited in
duration and geographic extent.” Victaulic Co. v. Tieman, 499
F.3d 227, 235 (3d Cir. 2007) (quoting Hess, 808 A.2d at 917).
To be “reasonably necessary for the protection of the employer,”
Pennsylvania law requires that the covenant be tailored to
protect legitimate business interests. Victaulic, 499 F.3d at 235.
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Wood challenges on appeal the District Court’s holding
that Zambelli had two legitimate business interests in enforcing
the restrictive covenant. First, the District Court concluded that
“protection of Zambelli’s customer goodwill is a legitimate
business interest.” 2009 WL 159182, at *10. Second, the
District Court held that “[t]he specialized training, knowledge
and skill Wood acquired during his seven years of employment
with Zambelli is also a legitimate interest.” Id. Both interests,
the Court reasoned, can be safeguarded through a reasonable
restrictive covenant in Wood’s employment agreement.
The District Court’s holding is consistent with
Pennsylvania law on legitimate business interests. We have
held, applying Pennsylvania law, that legitimate business
interests include trade secrets, confidential information,
goodwill, unique or extraordinary skills, and specialized training
that would benefit competitors. See Victaulic Co., 499 F.3d at
235. A business’ goodwill entitled to protection is that which
“represents a preexisting relationship arising from a continuous
course of business.” Butler v. Butler, 663 A.2d 148, 152 n.9
(Pa. 1995).
Here, Wood’s considerable amount of client contact, and
attendant familiarity with Zambelli’s confidential business
information, are both legitimate and protectable parts of a
business’ goodwill relationship with its clients. Under similar
facts, the district court in National Business Services Inc. v.
Wright, 2 F. Supp. 2d 701 (E.D. Pa. 1998), observed that an
employer’s goodwill interests were implicated where the former
employee had “wide-ranging contact with [the employer’s]
customers and potential customers over a significant period of
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time . . . [and] had access to confidential information regarding
[the employer’s] customers, products, technical details, and
marketing strategies.” Id. at 708. Significantly, the court there
concluded that it is “virtually inconceivable that [the former
employee] would be able to avoid utilizing the confidential
information . . . and exploiting [the employer’s] customer
goodwill.” Id. The analysis is the same here – Wood had access
to Zambelli’s client list, pricing and business strategy, and had
a longstanding relationship with Zambelli clients, who viewed
him as a leader in the industry due, in part, to Zambelli’s efforts
to advertise Wood’s specialized skills. Zambelli therefore had
a legitimate business interest in ensuring that Wood did not
transfer that goodwill to Pyrotecnico, its direct competitor.
Likewise, the District Court found that Wood received
specialized training paid for by Zambelli and “acquired and
developed unique skills that are very specific to the pyrotechnic
industry.” 2009 WL 159182, at *3. Specifically, Wood
received personal training from Ernie Simmons on layout and
choreography, id. at *2, gained first-hand experience by
participating in aerial fireworks displays, id., received
specialized training from the Pyrotechnic Guild International
allowing him to become one of only sixty-eight certified trainers
in the United States, id., and became licensed in Colorado and
New York, id. These are precisely the sort of specialized
training and skills that we have previously held are a legitimate
business interest, appropriately subject to protection through the
use of a restrictive covenant. Victaulic, 499 F.3d at 235 (citing
Morgan’s Home Equip. Corp. v. Martucci, 136 A.2d 838, 846
(Pa. 1957)).
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In response, Wood relies primarily on Hess for the
principle that “[i]f the covenant is inserted into the agreement
for some other purpose, as for example, eliminating or
repressing competition or to keep the employee from competing
so that the employer can gain an economic advantage, the
covenant will not be enforced.” 808 A.2d at 920-21. This
reasoning is unpersuasive in two regards. First, this language in
Hess is purely dicta. The legal issue in Hess was the
assignability of a restrictive covenant in an asset sale. Although
the court made various forays into the legitimacy of the business
interests, it does not purport to analyze or apply the off-hand
statement quoted by Wood. Second, Wood suggests that this
language applies to Zambelli’s conduct without engaging the
body of Pennsylvania case law holding that goodwill and
specialized training are protectable interests. In fact, the court
in Victaulic held that “not allowing competitors to profit from an
employee’s specialized training and skills is a legitimate use of
a covenant.” 499 F.3d at 235. To the extent this reasoning
conflicts with dicta from Hess, the principal holding in Victaulic
guides our analysis.
Accordingly, we hold that the District Court did not err
in holding that Zambelli had a legitimate business interest in its
customer goodwill and Wood’s specialized training and skills.3

3

Wood also argues that the District Court improperly
relied on its determination that the defendants “made a knowing,
calculated decision to breach the 2005 Agreement” when it was
weighing the equities of entering a preliminary injunction.
(Wood Br. 12-14 (quoting 2009 WL 159182, at *17).) Although
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D.
Finally, Wood challenges the District Court’s failure to
require Zambelli to post a bond in connection with the
preliminary injunction, as required by Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 65(c). Rule 65(c) states that “[t]he court may issue a
preliminary injunction . . . only if the movant gives security in an
amount that the court considers proper to pay the costs and
damages sustained by any party found to have been wrongfully
enjoined or restrained.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(c) (emphasis added).
In its Order granting in part Zambelli’s request for a
preliminary injunction, the District Court stated:
The Court notes the security provision in Fed. R.
Civ. P. 65(c). However, with no party having
requested same and the Court seeing no imminent

we agree that Wood’s prior conduct is not relevant to whether
Wood would suffer irreparable injury from the injunction, the
District Court provided a number of additional reasons that the
balance of the equities favor enforcement of the 2005
Agreement including that, under the modified terms of the
injunction, “Wood is able to maintain his employment at
Pyrotecnico” subject to restrictions on what work he performs.
2009 WL 159182, at *17. Should the Court have occasion to
consider the issuance of an injunction on remand, there will thus
be other factors that weigh in favor of Zambelli when evaluating
the risk of injury to Wood from a wrongful injunction.
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need for bond, security will be waived at this time
subject to future request.
2009 WL 159182, at *19. Wood argues that the District Court
abused its discretion in waiving the bond requirement. We
agree.
As we held in Frank’s GMC Truck Center, Inc., 847 F.2d
100, 103 (3d Cir. 1988), “[a]lthough the amount of the bond is
left to the discretion of the court, the posting requirement is
much less discretionary. While there are exceptions, the
instances in which a bond may not be required are so rare that
the requirement is almost mandatory.” Id. Such an extremely
narrow exception exists “when complying with the preliminary
injunction ‘raises no risk of monetary loss to the defendant.’”
Hoxworth v. Blinder, Robinson & Co., Inc., 903 F.2d 186, 210
(3d Cir. 1990) (quoting Sys. Operations, Inc. v. Scientific Games
Dev. Corp., 555 F.2d 1131, 1145 (3d Cir. 1977)).
Zambelli argues that this case falls within the rare
exception to Rule 65(c) because the District Court held that
“Wood will not suffer direct monetary harm if the 2005
Employment Agreement is enforced because Pyrotecnico has
agreed to indemnify him for any loss of salary and legal
expenses he may incur for the duration of any non-compete
restriction.” 2009 WL 159182, at *17.
We disagree that waiver of Rule 65(c) is appropriate
here. We have never excused a District Court from requiring a
bond where an injunction prevents commercial, money-making
activities. Rather, we have recognized exceptions in other
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contexts only where “the balance of [the] equities weighs
overwhelmingly in favor of the party seeking the injunction”
and when the District Court “make[s] specific findings.” Elliott
v. Kiesewetter, 98 F.3d 47, 60 (3d Cir. 1996); see also Temple
Univ. v. White, 941 F.2d 201, 219 n.26 (3d Cir. 1991)
(collecting cases). The District Court made no such “specific
finding” here in support of its waiver of the requirements of
Rule 65(c). Nor does Pyrotecnico’s indemnification obligation
have any bearing on the equities of imposing a bond; the fact
that Wood may be able to recover litigation expenses from a
third party does not excuse Zambelli’s obligation to compensate
Wood for his losses should he ultimately prevail in the
litigation.4

4

This Court has explained:

The requirement of security is rooted in the belief
that a defendant deserves protection against a
court order granted without the full deliberation a
trial offers. That protection consists of a promise
that the defendant will be reimbursed for losses
suffered if it turns out that the order was
erroneous in the sense that it would not have been
issued if there had been the opportunity for full
deliberation.
Am. Bible Soc’y v. Blount, 446 F.2d 588, 595 n.12 (3d Cir.
1971).
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Finally, we note that the District Court’s observation that
no party requested the Rule 65(c) bond imposes a prerequisite
not required on the face of the rule. Rule 65(c) constrains a
district court’s authority to enter a preliminary injunction,
making it contingent upon the posting of a bond. It does not
impose any obligation on the parties to seek a bond.
We therefore hold that a district court lacks discretion
under Rule 65(c) to waive a bond requirement except in the
exceptionally narrow circumstance where the nature of the
action necessarily precludes any monetary harm to the
defendant, and that such bond shall be issued irrespective of any
request by the parties. Because the District Court in this case
erred in waiving the Rule 65(c) bond requirement, we will
vacate the injunction and remand with instructions to impose
such a bond should the District Court decide to reissue the
injunction.
IV.
For the foregoing reasons, we will dismiss Pyrotecnico
from this suit, affirm the District Court’s holding that the
restrictive covenant in the 2005 Agreement is enforceable under
Pennsylvania law, vacate the preliminary injunction for failure
to comply with the requirements of Rule 65(c), and remand to
the District Court for proceedings consistent with this opinion.
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